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The rotating Council presidency hinders legislative continuity
in the Council of the European Union
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union is held on a rotational basis by EU
member states for six month terms. Andreas Warntjen writes that the frequent change of the
Presidency sometimes causes disruption in EU legislative decision-making. He notes that
during the negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty the principle of increasing the term from six months
up to a year was rejected in favour of creating a permanent President of the European
Council, which is held by an individual for terms of two and a half years. Despite this change,
however, the limited role of the European Council in legislative negotiations has ensured that
continuity in Council decision-making still presents a challenge.
The European Union needs to respond in an ef f icient and timely manner to the challenges of  a complex
and f ast-changing world if  it  wants to ef f ectively f urther the welf are of  its cit izens. This requires continuity
of  legislative decision-making. Shortcomings in this regard were identif ied in the discussions leading up to
the Lisbon treaty, which sets out the rules f or decision-making in the EU.
A special f ocus was placed on the work of  both
the Council of  the European Union (of ten
ref erred to simply as ‘the Council’), where
ministers and civil servants discuss legislative
proposals, and of  the European Council, where
the heads of  government decide the broad
guidelines of  EU policy. A particular concern was
the length of  the term of  of f ice of  the Council
presidency, which chairs and organises the
meetings of  the Council. The Convention on the
Future of  Europe decided to increase the term
of  of f ice of  the Council presidency f rom six
months to a minimum of  one year to strengthen
the continuity of  the Council’s legislative work.
Other suggestions involved a stronger role f or
the Secretary-General in steering the Council’s
legislative work.
The Lisbon treaty, however, lef t the six-monthly rotation in place f or the presidency of  the Council. Instead,
continuity in the decision-making process of  the Council is supposed to be ensured by a longer term
presidency of  the European Council, of  up to f ive years, as well as closer coordination between the
rotating Council presidencies in the f orm of  multi-annual programmes. The Lisbon treaty theref ore installed
a hybrid solution and two separate presidencies: a longer term presidency f or the meetings of  the heads of
government in the European Council, but a continuation of  the rotation system f or the meetings of  the
ministers discussing EU legislation in the Council.
The rotating Council presidency remains primarily in charge of  the deliberative process regarding legislative
proposals, most of  which are not discussed in the European Council, but only in the Council of  the
European Union. Furthermore, multi-annual programmes have only a limited ef f ect on the actual conduct of
individual Council presidencies. Thus, the ref orms of  the Lisbon treaty are unlikely to represent a major
step in increasing the continuity of  the Council’s legislative work.
The Council is chaired by the member states on a half -yearly system of  rotation. Every six months, a new
government takes over the role of  chairing the meetings of  the ministers and working groups of  civil
servants discussing EU legislation in the Council. However, many discussions on legislative proposals are
not resolved during one presidency term.
The f requent presidency changes can lead to inef f iciencies in the legislative process. Due to national
sensit ivit ies and dif f erent priorit ies, the discussions on some proposals are ef f ectively stalled during a
specif ic presidency.  During the Council presidency of  a country, EU af f airs receive more coverage f rom the
national press of  that country. A presidency sometimes delays discussions on a legislative proposal that is
controversial in its country, to avoid resolution while they are in the spotlight as the chair of  the Council.
Governments also of ten try to use the presidency to highlight topics that are of  particular national
importance. Thus, priorit ies can shif t f rom one presidency term to the next. An incoming presidency might
also approach some topics f rom a dif f erent angle, thereby introducing discontinuit ies in the ongoing
discussions. For example, the new presidency might pursue a dif f erent strategy in an ef f ort to build a
suf f icient consensus on a pending proposal.
A change of  the presidency can interrupt the legislative process and lead to a less ef f icient negotiation
process: momentum is lost, inf ormation becomes outdated, and compromises f ade away. This can lead to
a major disruption in the discussion of  some legislative proposals and, at the aggregate level, quite
substantial inef f iciencies in the legislative process overall.
The elected, long-term presidency of  the European Council does represent a major innovation in the
decision-making process of  the European Council. It does not, however, necessarily have a major impact on
the process of  legislative decision-making in the Council. The European Council only meets a f ew times a
year and most of  its discussions are devoted to broad issues of  f oreign policy and the overall
development of  the EU: f or example how to respond to the Eurozone crisis. Only a small percentage of
legislative proposals are discussed by the heads of  government in the European Council. In contrast, the
Council, in its various f ormations of  ministerial and working group meetings, discusses all legislative
proposals. The Council also meets more f requently than the European Council. Thus, the bulk of  the
legislative deliberations take place in the Council, not in the European Council.
Similarly, the multi-annual programmes are a usef ul tool f or planning successive presidencies. However, the
extent to which they actually guide the conduct of  individual presidencies in steering the legislative work of
the Council is debatable. The multi-annual programme can only give broad guidelines, which might be out-
of -date by the time a new presidency term starts. Thus, the rotating Council presidency is primarily in
charge of  steering legislative deliberations in the Council.
The hybrid solution of  the Lisbon treaty represents a trade-of f  between the goal of  strengthening the
continuity of  the EU’s legislative decision-making and the benef its of  a rotation system. The latter include
the dispersion of  inf luence, equal opportunity to highlight topics of  national importance, and the learning
ef f ect of  holding the presidency. One should note, however, that the value of  some of  these  benef its is
diminished in a Union of  28 member states, where a country only holds the presidency once every 14 years.
An elected, longer term presidency f or the Council, possibly consisting of  a representative set of  several
governments, or a stronger role f or the Secretary-General, would probably increase the continuity of  the
Council’s legislative work. The benef its of  more ef f icient legislative decision-making in the Council might
outweigh the diminished benef its of  a rotation system.
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